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Abstract 
 
War and refugees are at the crossroads between IHL, human rights, and refugee law. 
Yet, the interplay between the three regimes remains unclear. This article offers a 
systematisation of available accounts, exposing their limits, and proposes an 
alternative, ‘cumulative’ approach to articulate their relationship. The final goal is to 
dispel persisting myths surrounding the fragmentation debate, contributing to the 
rationalisation of systemic integration. The proposal is grounded in Article 31 VCLT 
taken as a whole, as underpinned by the principle of good faith. A procedural rule of 
conduct and a redefinition of norm conflicts lie at the heart of this conceptualisation. 
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1. Introduction: The Interplay between IHL, Human Rights, and Refugee Law  
 
Armed conflict has long been the theatre of the direst human rights violations and is 
the ‘greatest cause of refugee flows today’.1 War is also at the crossroads between 
international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law (IRL), and human rights law 
(IHRL). The ‘triangulation’ of these three regimes and their precise interrelation 
remain, however, unclear. 
Discussion on the interplay respectively between IHL-IHRL, IHL-IRL, and 
IRL-IHRL is not new.2 Yet, it has attracted special attention following a series of 
pronouncements by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), ratifying the continued 
applicability of human rights in wartime.3 As a result, commentators agree that a shift 
in focus is required, from the question of whether to that of how human rights apply 
during armed conflict.4 A similar debate has emerged around the ‘war flaw’ and the 
purported inability of IRL to deal on its own with ‘conflict-based’ claims.5 
                                                                   
* Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary, University of London [v.moreno-lax@qmul.ac.uk]. I am indebted to 
Magolsia Fitzmaurice and the journal reviewers for their suggestions on previous drafts. 
1 Speech by former UNHCR R. Lubbers 843 International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) (2001) 578. 
2 See respectively O. Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law (OUP, 2011); D. Cantor and J.-F. Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees 
and International Humanitarian Law (Brill, 2014); and V. Chetail, ‘Are Refugee Rights Human 
Rights?’, in R. Rubio-Marín (ed.), Human Rights and Immigration (OUP, 2014) 19. 
3 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996) 226; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports (2004) 136; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. 
Uganda), ICJ Reports (2005) 116. 
4 S. Sivakumaran, ‘International Humanitarian Law’, in D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran (eds), 
International Human Rights Law (2dn edn., OUP, 2014) 479, at 495. 
5 H. Storey, ‘Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The “War-Flaw”’ 31 Refugee Survey Quarterly (RSQ) 
(2012) 1; J.-F. Durieux, ‘Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo Storey’ 31 RSQ (2012) 
161; and S.S. Juss, ‘Problematising the Protection of “War Refugees”: A Rejoinder to Hugo Storey and 
Jean-Francois Durieux’ 32 RSQ (2013) 122. 
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 Relying on the wider literature on fragmentation and systemic integration, the 
purpose of this article is twofold. It will, first, offer a systematisation of the different 
stances, proposing three models organised around the ideas of ‘displacement’, 
‘complementarity’, and ‘harmonisation’. 6  The analysis will expose their limits, 
providing a comprehensive account of cross-systemic links in Sections 2 to 4. The 
shortcomings of available positions will then be addressed through a proposal to think 
of inter-regime relations holistically. The position taken by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in the case of Diakité will be used as an example of the alternative 
‘cumulative’ model proposed in Section 5.7  
Overall, the final goal is to dispel persisting myths and assumptions 
surrounding the fragmentation debate, contributing to the rationalisation of the 
‘principle of systemic integration’.8 The proposal is grounded in accepted canons of 
interpretation, taking the principle of good faith and the entirety of Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as a starting place.9 Far from 
suggesting that there is a super-axiology overarching the whole of international law 
capable of organising normative values in hierarchical fashion, a procedural rule of 
conduct and a redefinition of norm conflicts lie at the heart of this systematisation.10 
 
2. Presuming Conflict? The Displacement Model 
 
The displacement model puts the emphasis on distinguishing factors and the 
exclusionary potential of the different law-sets bearing on war situations. Elements 
such as historical roots, the distinctive teloi of each regime, and their differing 
applicability thresholds are highlighted.11 In turn, these factors are put in a frame of 
conflict and a solution is attained by according pre-eminence to one or another regime 
or one or another norm, drawing on different acceptions of lex specialis, 12 
notwithstanding erratic jurisprudence and controversies surrounding the maxim.13  
At least three variations of the model can be distinguished. First, ‘systemic 
pre-eminence’ relies on the thickest form of lex specialis, considering the entire 
branch of IHL as a ‘self-contained regime’ of leges speciales, limiting resort to IHRL 
or IRL as a fall-back recourse. Yet, possible lacunae are filled not with ‘pure’ 
IHRL/IRL standards, but as modified or adapted by IHL to the war context. 
‘Contextual pre-eminence’, on the other hand, considers relations at norm, rather than 
                                                                   
6 Drawing partly on O.A. Hathaway et al., ‘Which Law Governs during Armed Conflict? The 
Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ 96 Minnesota Law 
Review (2011-2012) 1883. 
7 Case C-285/12 Diakité, 30 January 2014. 
8 C. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’ 
54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ) (2005) 279. 
9 1155 UNTS 331. On the customary law value of Arts 31 and 32, see Avena and other Mexican 
Nationals (Mexico v. USA), ICJ Reports (2004) 12, para. 83. 
10 It is not disputed that such meta-values exist, what is doubted is whether these are arranged in a 
specific hierarchy. See E. Voyiakis, ‘International Law and the Objectivity of Value’ 22 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (LJIL) (2009) 51. 
11 A. Eide, ‘The Laws of War and Human Rights – Differences and Convergences’, in C. Swinarski 
(ed.), Studies and Essays in Honour of Jean Pictet (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 675. 
12 M. Koskenniemi (Rapp.), Study on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ILC 58th Sess., (A/CN.4/L.682), paras 46-222. 
13 See, generally, A. Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The 
Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ 74 Nordic Journal International Law (2005) 27; N. Prud’homme, ‘Lex 
Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?’ 40 Israel Law Review 
(ILR) (2007) 355. 
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regime, level, using lex specialis in individual cases to justify the exclusion of one 
rule in favour of another from another sub-system or to alter the substance of the rule 
concerned to adjust it to the exigencies of armed conflict. Finally, ‘reverse 
displacement’ constitutes the mirror image of ‘systemic pre-eminence’, with either 
IHRL or IRL being adopted as primary reference framework instead of IHL.  
 
2.1 Systemic Pre-eminence: Lex Specialis at Regime Level  
 
Until the 1970s, the predominant view was that IHL was the only applicable law in 
wartime.14 UNHCR similarly appeared to accept that persons fleeing armed conflict 
were not ‘normally’ refugees,15 supporting the understanding that a ‘differential 
impact’ had to be shown, based on 1951 Convention reasons, ‘over and above the 
ordinary risks of … warfare’ for someone to qualify as such.16 Following the ICJ 
Nuclear Weapons Opinion, it is now accepted that ‘the protection of [human rights] 
does not cease in times of war, except by operation of [derogation clauses]’.17 And 
UNHCR has also refined its position, clarifying that persons meeting the refugee 
definition qualify for 1951 Convention status, regardless of the cause of flight.18 
Concerning the interaction between IHL and IHRL, the ICJ held that during 
wartime, the content of certain human rights must be interpreted in light of IHL. The 
Court observed that ‘[i]n principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life 
applies also in hostilities’, but ‘[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life … 
then falls to be determined by … the law applicable in armed conflict’.19 This has led 
some scholars to maintain that IHL should prevail as a ‘self-contained regime’ or a set 
of leges speciales, displacing human rights en bloc.20 IHL, as the system specifically 
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities, is taken to effectively set aside IHRL 
as the primary reference point to assess the legality of action.21  
 The reference to lex specialis was reiterated in the Wall Opinion, where the 
ICJ identified three possible scenarios concerning the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL. It concluded that there could be situations in which ‘some rights may be 
exclusively matters of [IHL]; others may be exclusively matters of [IHRL]; yet others 
may be matters of both these branches’. When coming to the concrete situation at 
hand, the Court considered both these branches, but continued to emphasise IHL ‘as 
lex specialis’.22 On this basis, Hampson and Salama have suggested that the Court 
made ‘clear that lex specialis is not being used to displace human rights law. It is 
rather an indication that human rights bodies should interpret a human rights norm in 
                                                                   
14 See e.g. O. Ben-Naftali and Y. Shany, ‘Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories’ 37 ILR (2004) 8. 
15  UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (reissued 
December 2011), para. 164. 
16 Adan [1998] UKHL 15; [1999] 1 AC 293, at 311. 
17 Nuclear Weapons, para. 25. 
18 UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on International Protection of Persons Fleeing Armed Conflict and 
Situations of Violence (Cape Town Roundtable, December 2012). 
19 Nuclear Weapons, para. 25. 
20 Cf. B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law’ 17 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) (2006) 483, at 492, rejecting the 
characterisation of international law branches as ‘self-contained regimes’. 
21 M. Dennis, ‘Non-Application of Civil and Political Rights Extraterritorially During Times of 
International Armed Conflict’ 40 ILR (2007) 453.  
22 Wall Opinion, para. 106. 
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the light of [IHL]’.23 But, as Hampson subsequently elaborated, this appears to imply 
that, where both IHL and IHRL are applicable, ‘priority should be given to IHL’ to 
guide the overall assessment.24  
Few scholars have relied on the lex specialis tenet to describe the relationship 
between IHL and IRL in abstract terms, according pre-eminence to the former to 
adjudicate international protection claims in war situations. Hampson stands alone 
alerting to the ‘danger’ of IHL being contaminated by IRL in this context.25 
 
2.2 Contextual Pre-eminence: Lex specialis at Norm Level 
 
Instead of approaching the matter from the perspective of ‘self-contained 
regimes’, in line with the Wall observation that there ‘may be exclusively matters of 
human rights law’ even in wartime,26 other authors have identified situations in which 
IHRL should prevail, especially when IHL ‘lack[s] greater specificity’ or would only 
apply ‘by way of analogy’.27 Rather than approaching the relationship between IHL 
and IHRL at regime level, lex specialis is used to administer individual norms 
relations, warranting a partial displacement of either IHL or IHRL, depending on the 
circumstances. This way, there is no allocation of pre-eminence of one system over 
the other by default. Primacy is established on a case-by-case basis.28 
The ‘special law’ is perceived to be more effective than its general counterpart 
to regulate the situation at hand and to better reflect the will of the parties.29 
Specificity, however, is volatile. It is considered contextual and dependent on 
perspective, predicated on event-related factors, including closeness to the battle field, 
or articulated in terms of other characteristics of the situation or the persons 
concerned, such as the definition of ‘protected persons’ in IHL, the category of 
‘everyone’ in IHRL, or ‘refugee’ in the 1951 Convention.30 So, the outcome of the lex 
specialis operation cannot be determined beforehand.  
Authors advocating this solution rely, in addition, on a broad construction of 
norm conflicts, as opposed to the classic, narrow understanding of traditional 
accounts.31 They include not only situations in which compliance with one rule 
constitutes a breach of the other, but also those in which diverging results may be 
achieved.32 Accordingly, ‘apparent’ conflicts, solvable via conform interpretation, are 
distinguished from ‘genuine’ ones, requiring formal methods of conflict resolution.33 
                                                                   
23 F. Hampson and I. Salama, Working Paper on the Relationship between Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14), para. 57.  
24 F. Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body’ 90 IRRC (2008) 549, at 559. 
25 F. Hampson, ‘The Scope of the Obligation Not to Return Fighters under the Law of Armed Conflict’, 
in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 373, at 373.  
26 Wall Opinion, para. 106. 
27 H. Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship between IHL and Human Rights Law in the 
ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (JC&SL) 265, at 273. 
28 Hathaway et al. supra note 6, at 1902 ff; C. Droege, ‘Elective Affinities? Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law’ 90 IRRC (2008) 501, at 522-524. 
29 ILC Study on Fragmentation, supra note 11, para. 60. 
30 189 UNTS 150. 
31 J. Mus, ‘Conflicts between Treaties in International Law’ 45 NILR (1998) 208; W. Jenks, ‘The 
Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ 30 British Yearbook of International Law (BYIL) (1953) 401. 
32 J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (CUP, 2003), at 184-188. 
33 Including jus cogens; Art. 103 of the UN Charter; conflict clauses in treaty law; or the operation of 
lex posterior in conformity with Art. 30 VCLT. 
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Considering the difficulty of decoupling the general from the special and the 
fact that it cannot assign priority ex post, lex specialis is rejected as a tool to solve 
‘genuine conflicts’ between rules from different regimes. Still, the maxim is accepted 
as an ex ante mechanism of ‘conflict avoidance’. Following this technique, Milanović 
has taken the Nuclear Weapons Opinion as an example, recognising that the method 
may require one of the norms to be ‘read down’ to accommodate the other. This is 
‘the price to be paid for the joint application of IHL and IHRL’.34  
 A similar stance has been advocated by Storey regarding IRL. The ‘war-flaw’ 
consists in the failure to acknowledge IHL as reference framework to analyse ‘war 
refugee’ claims. In his view, IHL should act as a supplement to the Refugee 
Convention in these cases, ‘provid[ing] scope and content to its protective 
provisions’, which may translate in the necessity to adapt the terms of the refugee 
definition to accommodate IHL.35 Consequently, where complementary forms of 
protection are envisaged, such as foreseen in the Qualification Directive,36 the IHL 
concepts of ‘civilian’ or ‘armed conflict’ should be taken into account to define their 
counterparts in EU law.37 Under this prism, for ‘ready-made’ definitions in IHL to be 
excluded, ‘there would have to be reasons justifying the departure’, outweighing the 
objectivity and transparency IHL infuses into the decision-making process.38 
 
2.3 Reverse Displacement  
 
‘Reverse displacement’ is the mirror image of the ‘systemic pre-eminence’ sub-
model. Although this position is not usually expressed in terms of lex specialis, 
adherents tend to promote the autonomy of the regimes concerned. 
The European Court of Human Rights, through its exclusive reliance on IHRL 
to appraise violations perpetrated in war or occupation, champions this understanding. 
The Chechen cases exemplify the approach, with the Court applying the ECHR,39 not 
only without reference to IHL, but also in a manner inconsistent with it.40 Indeed, 
although it borrowed IHL terms, the Court did not employ them in an IHL sense.41 
This is particularly visible in the proportionality assessment regarding the 
right to life – in sharp contradistinction to the Nuclear Weapons reasoning. Recourse 
to lethal force must be ‘strictly proportionate’ and justified by the ‘permitted aims’ 
listed in Article 2 ECHR.42 ‘Automatic’ resort to killing is excluded, regardless of any 
military advantage it may procure.43 There is an implicit duty of care stemming from 
the positive obligation on State Parties to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in … [the] Convention’.44 Accordingly, states have to 
                                                                   
34  M. Milanović, ‘A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship between International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ 14 JC&SL (2010) 459, at 461. 
35 Storey, supra note 5, at 15. 
36 Directive 2011/95/EU [2011] OJ L 337/9 (QD). 
37 Along these lines, the UKAIT elaborated ‘an IHL reading of Article 15(c) [QD]’, which was 
subsequently reversed: KH [2008] UKAIT 00023, paras 33-62; and QD & AH [2009] EWCA Civ 620. 
38 Storey, supra note 5, at 15; and H. Storey, ‘The “War Flaw” and Why it Matters’, in Cantor and 
Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 39, at 40. 
39 (1950) CETS 5. 
40 W. Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of International Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human 
Rights in Chechnya’ 16 EJIL (2005) 741, at 742. 
41 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia [2005] 41 EHRR 847, para. 175. 
42 Isayeva v. Russia [2005] 41 EHRR 791, para. 181. 
43 McCann v. UK [1995] 21 EHRR 97, para. 213. 
44 Art. 1 ECHR. 
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plan law enforcement operations so as to minimize recourse to force and to conduct 
effective investigations of any incidents that may occur.45 
By contrast, the notion of ‘permitted aims’ is unknown to IHL. IHL is neutral 
regarding the justness of war. 46  Under IHL, if a combatant is killed, the 
proportionality assessment does not focus on the combatant himself, but on collateral 
damage and the effect on civilian persons and objects.47 If risks to civilians have been 
considered and the target is a legitimate military one, lethal force may be allowed 
even as first recourse.48  
Although the Court appears to accept that, in case of an explicit derogation, a 
state of war would have been taken into account,49 there are no indications that the 
fundamentals of the proportionality analysis should be altered to accommodate IHL. 
To the contrary, the Court has asserted that ‘obligation[s] under Article 2 continue to 
apply in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict’.50 The 
same test is used in all instances of recourse to lethal force, probably because the 
same outcome could not be secured through an IHL-based reading.51  
Following the Strasbourg Court, proponents of this approach reject the 
assumption that IHL and IHRL can or should be reconciled.52 
Refugee scholars, in large part, have shown similar resistance to incorporating 
IHL into IRL analyses, invoking, if not hierarchical primacy in the formal sense, at 
least the prevalence of the 1951 Convention ‘as a form of lex specialis’.53 However, 
the degree of self-sufficiency attributed to IRL varies.  
Some authors discard the overall ‘utility’ of IHL-based accounts, fearing the 
impact a substantive assimilation of IRL with IHL notions may entail.54 Others plead 
for autonomous constructions of common concepts particularly with regard to 
qualification criteria, despite the (implicit) reference in the 1951 Convention to ‘the 
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of … crimes [against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity]’ to determine exclusion from refugee 
status.55 The fact that refugeehood is not contingent on peace or war, the lack of 
consensus on the interpretation of key IHL terms, and differing membership in the 
relevant instruments justify the stance.56 This is the position adopted in Elgafaji, 
where the ECJ established that the interpretation of Article 15(c) QD had to be 
undertaken ‘independently’, with no consideration of IHL.57 
                                                                   
45 Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia [2005] 42 EHRR 20. 
46 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th edn., Basic Books, 1977), at 131-132. 
47 Arts 51(5)(b) and 52(2) AP I, 1125 UNTS 3. 
48 N. Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict’ 87 IRRC (2005) 737, at 
744-749. 
49 See Isayeva, supra note 42, para. 191: ‘the use of this kind of weapon … outside wartime and 
without prior evacuation of the civilians, is impossible to reconcile with the degree of caution expected 
from a law enforcement body in a democratic society’ (emphasis added). 
50 Al-Skeini v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 18, para. 164. 
51  Cf. A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
Fragmentation, Conflict Parallelism, or Convergence?’ 19 EJIL (2008) 161, at 174. 
52 B. Bowring, ‘Fragmentation, Lex Specialis and the Tensions in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ 14 JC&SL (2010) 485, at 487. 
53 J. McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (OUP, 2007), at 1 and 209. 
54 C. Bauloz, ‘The (Mis)Use of International Humanitarian Law under Article 15(c) of the EU 
Qualification Directive’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 245, at 269. 
55 Art. 1(F) Refugee Convention. 
56 G. Gilbert, ‘Exclusion is Not Just about Saying “No”: Taking Exclusion Seriously in Complex 
Conflicts’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 155. 
57 Case C-465/07 Elgafaji [2009] ECR I-921, paras 45 and 39. 
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While preserving a focus on IRL, other authors envisage a degree of openness 
to IHL, matching the evolution of UNHCR’s approach.58 Durieux, albeit perceiving 
armed conflict as ‘contextual’ and refusing its characterisation as the ‘subject matter’ 
of a refugee enquiry, concedes to the permeability of IRL.59 Likewise, Woods has 
proposed that IHL be used as a set of ‘indicia’ in the context of expanded refugee 
definitions to establish refugee-producing events.60 The limits of a possible IHL 
contribution should thus be considered in light of IRL so that, for example, not all 
instances of armed conflict as defined in IHL may be relevant, if war has been 
declared but no actual fighting occurs or occupation is not met with armed 
opposition, 61  as that could hardly justify a need for international protection. 
Conversely, meeting IAC/NIAC thresholds should not be determinative of an asylum 
claim, as there may be instances in which the effects of violence warrant the flight. 
The difference between this structured or qualified permeability paradigm and 
the complementarity model discussed below is the point of departure. While the 
former situates IRL as the framework of reference, the latter places IRL and IHL on 
the same plane. Both recognise the possibility of synergies between the two regimes, 
but one views it from a cautious, rather than a positive, perspective. 
 
2.4 Displacement Assessment  
 
Overall, the major shortcoming of the displacement model is its ‘all-or-
nothing’ approach, either at systemic or contextual level, mediated by the lex specialis 
maxim and an over-expansive notion of normative conflict, which intertwines rules 
and exceptions from different normative orders, ultimately displacing or significantly 
altering the substance of the original norms. Lex specialis requires a material overlap, 
where both the specific and general provisions share ‘the same substantive matter’,62 
presupposing the existence of a unified legislative will agreeing to the introduction of 
an implicit hierarchy between the norms concerned. The absence of these 
preconditions makes the notion volatile, rendering application beyond relationships 
within the same system unreliable. Consequently, under none of the three sub-models 
is there a win-win solution, whereby IHL, IHRL, and IRL coexist with the possibility 
of deploying their intended effects. Underlying all three variants, there is a lurking 
assumption that concurrent application comes at a cost. 
 
3. Pursuing Convergence? The Complementarity Model  
 
In practice, recourse to the lex specialis rule has been sparse and ambiguous. Different 
adjudication bodies have used it for different purposes. The ICJ, beside references in 
the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Opinions, has normally employed it to identify the 
law applicable to a dispute, especially in cases of overlap between customary and 
                                                                   
58 UNHCR, Safe at Last? Law and Practice in Selected EU Member States with Respect to Asylum-
Seekers Fleeing Indiscriminate Violence (July 2011), at 104, cautioning against IHL. Cf. UNHCR, 
Summary Conclusions on Complementarities between International Refugee Law, International 
Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law (Arusha Expert Meeting, April 2011); and Cape 
Town Roundtable, supra note 18.  
59 Durieux, supra note 5, at 164. 
60  T. Woods, ‘The African War Refugee: Using IHL to Interpret the 1969 African Refugee 
Convention’s Expanded Refugee Definition’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 179. 
61 Common Art. 2, 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287. 
62 G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the international Court of Justice 1951-1954: Treaty 
Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ 33 BYIL (1957) 236, at 237. 
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treaty rules on the same issue, or between general and local custom, highlighting the 
dispositive nature of international law.63 WTO authorities, in turn, have referred to the 
rule only with regard to strict cases of conflict within the WTO regime.64 By contrast, 
the Strasbourg Court has used it as a tool of procedural economy to select the most 
specific ECHR provision applicable in a given case.65 This partly explains why the 
maxim was not codified in the VCLT,66 and why it was abandoned in DRC v. 
Uganda, where the Court simply stated that both IHL and IHRL ‘have to be taken 
into consideration’ in wartime.67 
 As a result, some scholars have looked for synergies, highlighting the potential 
for mutual supportiveness and complementarity. In particular, the possibility of either 
system offering higher protection in any given case has been highlighted, speaking of 
the potential humanisation of IHL or the humanitarisation of IHRL.68 The accent is 
put on bridging clauses, such as the Martens clause in IHL, and derogation and 
‘saving clauses’ in IHRL and IRL instruments, arguably allowing for a substantive 
‘merger’ of the relevant standards.69 
 This is the direction taken by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. In Abella, it considered that, notwithstanding jurisdictional limits on its 
competence, Article 29 ACHR, precluding interpretations that would restrict rights 
recognised outside the Convention,70 enabled it to rely directly on the provision 
offering better protection to the individual, even ‘[i]f that higher standard is a rule of 
humanitarian law’.71 
 The ICTY has followed suit. Regardless of jurisdictional constraints, the 
Tribunal has highlighted the similarity of IHL and IHRL. Both ‘focus on respect for 
human values and the dignity of the human person’, sharing ‘a common “core” of 
fundamental standards … from which no derogation is permitted’, protecting 
individuals from the most ‘heinous acts’ at all times.72 This justifies substantive 
borrowing from IHRL ‘to determine the content of customary international law in the 
field of humanitarian law’.73 On the other hand, the Tribunal has been mindful to 
recall that the borrowing can only happen if IHRL notions ‘take into consideration the 
specificities of [IHL]’.74 On this basis, it has developed its own jurisprudential line on 
torture, taking guidance from IHRL, but keeping IHL features in mind.75 
                                                                   
63 See respectively Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports (1997) 7, 
para. 132; and Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits) (Portugal v. India), 
ICJ Reports (1960) 6, at 44. 
64 See e.g. Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO/DS34/R, 31 May 
1999, para. 9.94. 
65 On Art. 6(1) as lex specialis of Art. 13 ECHR, see Brualla v. Spain, [2001] 33 EHRR 57, para. 41. 
66 Discussions focused instead on the lex posterior maxim, introduced in Art. 30 VCLT. See I. Sinclair, 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (MUP, 1984), at 94. 
67 DRC v. Uganda, para. 216. 
68 See, respectively, T. Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ 94 AJIL (2000) 239; and J. 
d’Aspremont and J. de Hemptinne, Droit international humanitaire (Pedone, 2012). 
69 R. Arnold and N. Quenivet (eds), International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law: Towards a 
New Merger in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). 
70 1144 UNTS 123. 
71 Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Report No. 55/97, 18 November 1997, paras 164-165. Cf. I-
ACtHR, rejecting direct application of IHL, but not precluding its interpretative potential in Las 
Palmeras v. Colombia (Preliminary Objections), Series C, Case No. 67, 4 February 2000, para. 33. 
72 Čelebići, IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, para. 149. 
73 Kunarac, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para. 467. 
74 Ibid., para. 471. 
75 R. Cryer, ‘The Interplay of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Approach of the ICTY’ 14 
JC&SL (2010) 511. 
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 The Human Rights Committee has also asserted that ‘both spheres of law are 
complementary, not mutually exclusive’.76 Adopting what has been denominated a 
‘belt and suspenders’ approach, it has relied on both bodies of law as providing a 
continuum of protection.77 In the Committee’s view, during armed conflict IHL rules 
become applicable ‘and help, in addition to [the derogation clause] of the [ICCPR], to 
prevent the abuse of a State’s emergency powers’.78 IHL provides a minimum floor of 
non-derogable rights complementing ICCPR protection during hostilities.79  
The theory has been imported to the IRL-IHL terrain, to articulate the 
relationship between the 1951 Convention and the law of armed conflict. 80  In 
wartime, the Refugee Convention allows for derogation in accordance with its Article 
9. Therefore, IHL, considering its non-derogable/customary law character, gains 
particular relevance in such situation, acting as a ‘brake’ on the measures concerned.81 
Although IHL instruments contain few special guarantees regarding a limited 
category of refugees, 82  displaced individuals may still be treated as ‘protected 
persons’, regardless of qualification under the 1951 Convention.83 And in the absence 
of derogation, refugees should benefit from the ‘dual protection’ of IRL applying 
‘concurrently’ with IHL.84 Article 5, excluding an interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention impairing any rights granted elsewhere, supports this construction.85 
The complementarity model assumes that IHL, IHRL, and IRL are engaged in 
a common mission, allowing their respective rules to be interpreted to avoid conflict. 
However, proponents of this method provide little details as for how the choice of law 
and the operation of integration should take place. Some rely on the prevailing factual 
circumstances, calling on pragmatics.86 They accept that there may be bounds to the 
humanisation of IHL considering the realities of war – thereby seemingly assuming a 
priori notions of feasibility that prejudge the very case to adjudicate. 
Borrowing from the lex specialis model, others emphasise the level of detail of 
the norms at play. They accord prevalence to the body containing the greater 
specificity, without questioning the (un-)suitability of ceding priority on grammatical 
grounds or semantic precision when dealing with norms from different regimes.87  
Still others appeal to substantive considerations, evaluating the benefits and 
shortcomings of terminological bridges across disciplines. Fripp, accordingly, has 
                                                                   
76 HRC, General Comment No. 31 (CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6), 21 April 2004, para. 11. 
77 W.A. Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law 
and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ 40 ILR (2007) 592, at 593. 
78 HRC, General Comment No. 29 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11), 24 July 2001, para. 3 ff.  
79 999 UNTS 171. 
80 W. Kälin, ‘Flight in Times of War’ 83 IRRC (2001) 629. 
81  D. Cantor, ‘Laws of Unintended Consequence? Nationality, Allegiance and the Removal of 
Refugees during Wartime’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 345, at 367. 
82 All provisions concern IACs only. See Art.  44 GC IV, on refugees who are nationals of a belligerent 
state; Art. 70 GC IV, on the relationship with the State of origin when it occupies the asylum state; Art. 
73 AP I, on refugees who have had their status recognized before the start of hostilities; and Art. 45(4) 
GC IV, on non-refoulement.  
83 On this point and its limits, see V. Chetail, ‘Armed Conflict and Forced Migration’, in A. Clapham 
and P. Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International aw in Armed Conflict (OUP, 2014) 700, at 
707 ff. 
84 S. Jaquemet, ‘The Cross-Fertilization of International Humanitarian Law and International Refugee 
Law’ 83 IRRC (2001) 651, at 652. 
85 In this line, see F. Bugnion, ‘Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Refugees’ 24 RSQ (2005) 36. 
86 I. Scobbie, ‘Principle or Pragmatics? The Relationship between Human Rights Law and the Law of 
Armed Conflict’ 14 JC&SL (2010) 449, at 456-457. 
87 Lubell, supra note 48, at 752; and Hathaway et al., supra note 6, proposing ‘five factors for 
determining specificity’, at 1917 ff. 
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advocated a comprehensive understanding of ‘persecution’ and ‘protection’ informed 
by both IHRL and IHL standards.88 On this account, IHL helps pinpointing means and 
tactics of warfare ‘contrary to the basic rules of human conduct’ that may be regarded 
as persecution, broadening IRL/IHRL understandings.89 On the reverse, a teleological 
construction, drawing on IRL/IHRL, may expand the non-refoulement effect of IHL 
norms, offering a parallel route to international protection.90 The limits of substantive 
mergers are also assessed to avoid destructive alliances, maintaining, for instance, that 
the fact that ‘combatants’ cannot qualify as ‘protected persons’ under IHL should not 
directly translate into an automatic exclusion from refugee status without examination 
of Article 1F criteria.91 Prudence works the other way around as well, to escape 
restrictive imports from IRL. As a result, the concept of ‘armed element’, developed 
by UNHCR for operational purposes, should not influence the legal characterisation 
of ‘combatant’, restricting IHL protection of civilians.92 Usually, authors in this group 
look at protection levels by each set of rules, pleading for the higher standard in 
favour of the pro humanitatis principle.93 
A final sector has suggested that focus on the minutiae of regime relations is a 
distraction. They propose, instead, a regime-transcendent paradigm, drawing on the 
IRL/IHL/IHRL intersection.94 Thus the notions of ‘humanitarian non-refoulement’ 
and ‘temporary refuge’ are considered as stemming directly from ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’,95 shared as lex communis.96 
Nonetheless, none of the variants of the complementarity approach fully 
expounds the particulars of regime interaction. Whether and to which extent IHL, 
IHRL or IRL should serve as interpretative aid or as main point of reference, on 
which basis, and how the choice should be made remains unexplained. 
 
4. Seeking Integration: A Systemic Approach to Harmonisation? 
 
A few commentators have attempted to theorise the interplay between IHL, IHRL, 
and IRL identifying a legal basis to articulate the link. The majority have resorted to 
                                                                   
88 E. Fripp, ‘Inclusion of Refugees from Armed Conflict: Combatants and Ex-combatants’, in Cantor 
and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 128, at 130. 
89 Krotov [2004] EWCA Civ 69, para. 9, on punishment for draft evasion in the Chechen conflict, 
participation in which would have led the claimant to engage in IHL violations; BE (Iran) [2008] 
EWCA Civ 540, on landmine planting in civilian areas justifying allowance of an asylum claim; and 
AM [2008] UKAIT 00091, para. 76, establishing that ‘serious violations of peremptory norms of IHL 
and human rights’ constitute persecution.  
90 R. Ziegler, ‘Non-Refoulement between “Common Article 1” and “Common Article 3”’, in Cantor 
and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 386. 
91 Fripp, supra note 88, at 140 ff. Cf. R. Brett and E. Lester, ‘Refugee Law and International 
Humanitarian Law: Parallels, Lessons and Looking ahead’ 83 IRRC (2001) 713, at 718. 
92 M. Janmyr, ‘Revisiting the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps’, in Cantor and 
Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 225, at 233 ff. 
93 P.A. Fernández Sánchez, ‘The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and Refugee Law’ 
1 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies (2010) 329, at 380. 
94 G.S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the “New” Asylum Seekers’, in 
Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 433. 
95 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), ICJ Reports (1949) 4, at 22. See also, Nicaragua, at 218, 
regarding Common Art. 3. 
96 J. Moore, ‘Protection against the Forced Return of War Refugees: An Interdisciplinary Consensus on 
Humanitarian Non-Refoulement’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 411, at 412-413. 
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Article 31(3)(c) VCLT to characterise the relationship in terms of conciliatory 
interpretation, striving to maintain the unity of international law.97  
 However, judicial practice offers little assistance in this respect. The ICJ 
recovered the hitherto dormant provision in Oil Platforms to justify interpretation of a 
bilateral treaty in light of customary law on the use of force, despite opposition by one 
of the parties and stark differences among individual judges.98 Article 31(3)(c) VCLT 
grounded the incorporation of a whole body of general law in the analysis of treaty 
norms.99 This contrasted with other uses of the clause by other courts, serving as an 
aid to interpretation to clarify ambiguous wording or to foster evolutive teleological 
constructions.100 The ICJ failed, nevertheless, to provide further guidance as to when 
and how Article 31(3)(c) VCLT should be applied. 
 This has not discouraged reliance on the ‘principle of systemic integration’ by 
several authors. Cassimatis, for instance, has advocated a method of interpretation 
that takes account of the core purposes and principles of each relevant regime in a 
manner that, at the same time, preserves the integrity of international law. 101 The 
underlying assumption is the formal unity of the system and the duty to interpret 
individual rules on account of their ‘normative environment’.102 Holzer, from her part, 
has also based her inclusive construction of IRL in war settings on a systemic 
understanding of international law, positing that the 1951 Convention must be 
interpreted and applied ‘in a way that is consistent’ with IHL.103 This places the 
‘principle of harmonisation’ at the centre of the interpretative strategy, according to 
which ‘when several norms bear on a single issue they should … be interpreted so as 
to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations’.104 
Arguably, the ICJ has implicitly endorsed this understanding in DRC v. 
Uganda. The judgment uses language that is reminiscent of the wording of Article 
31(3)(c) VCLT, when stipulating that ‘Uganda at all times has responsibility for all 
actions and omissions of its own military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach 
of its obligations under the rules of [IHRL] and [IHL] which are relevant and 
applicable in the specific situation’.105 
 On this basis, some have ventured into the formulation of fixed criteria 
according to which the balancing of IHL and IHRL/IRL principles should be 
undertaken. Prud’homme has advanced a method that takes account of the type of 
conflict, the type of right, and the type of protected person to select the appropriate 
                                                                   
97 The discussion here is limited to ‘systemic integration’, leaving aside evolutive interpretation and 
inter-temporality. For analysis of the three notions, see S.T. Helmersen, ‘Evolutive Treaty 
Interpretation: Legality, Semantics and Distinctions’ 6 European Journal of Legal Studies (2013) 127. 
98 Case concerning Oil Platforms  (Iran v. USA), ICJ Reports (2003) 161; and Separate Opinions of 
Judges Buergenthal, Simma, Higgins, and Kooijmans. 
99 See also Al-Adsani v. UK [2002] 34 EHRR 273, using the provision to pre-empt conflict between the 
right to fair trial and customary norms on State immunity. 
100 See respectively Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. UK) (Request for Provisional Measures Order) [2001] 
ITLOS List of Cases No. 10; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998; and Golder v. UK [1975] 1 EHRR 524.  
101  A.E. Cassimatis, ‘International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and 
Fragmentation of International Law’ 56 ICLQ (2007) 623, at 631. 
102 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia, ICJ Reports (1971) 16, at 31. 
103  V. Holzer, ‘Persecution and the Nexus to a Convention Ground: Insights from Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 101, at 108. 
104 ILC Report on the work of its 58th Sess., UNGAOR 55th Sess., Suppl. 10 (A/56/10), 408. 
105 DRC v. Uganda, para. 180 (emphasis added). 
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standard.106 However, she fails to reveal the legal grounding of this selection, why 
other factors should not be considered together with the chosen three, or how to 
proceed in case of conflict between the preferred criteria. Although Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT may be taken to promote legal consistency, it is uncertain whether it goes as 
far as to predetermine the factors on which harmonisation should be structured.  
 At the other end of the spectrum, d’Aspremont suggests that the choice of 
reference framework is ultimately discretionary, only limited by mandate or 
jurisdictional constraints. As this is hardly a satisfactory solution from a legal 
certainty perspective, he advances that there may be pragmatic, extra-legal 
considerations pleading in favour of IHL, preventing the redundancy of the regime. 107 
 Sands, in contrast, has rejected discretion as a basis to select the relevant 
framework, focusing instead on the peremptory language of Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT.108 The provision explicitly reads that ‘[t]here shall be taken into account, 
together with the context … any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. So, the normative environment must be considered 
when interpreting IHL, IHRL, or IRL in armed conflict. But not all rules are 
important, only those that are ‘relevant’ and ‘applicable’.  
‘Relevance’ appears to relate to the subject matter of the norms at stake,109 
whilst ‘applicability’ to the binding character upon the parties disputing their 
interpretation or possibly to general questions of scope.110 In turn, ‘take into account’ 
suggests consideration of the relevant rules to a lesser extent than ‘apply’, on the basis 
that norms in the background should not displace the norm being interpreted. 
However, the meaning of these terms is open to contestation.111  
 ‘Take into account’ is arguably the key element. The travaux reveal that 
discussion on this point focused on the type of source. Negotiations advanced from 
general acceptance that interpretation should consider ‘general principles of 
international law’,112 to a more comprehensive position encompassing ‘any rules of 
international law’.113 Yet, the bulk of the debate revolved around matters of inter-
temporal law.114 
Although it remains difficult to discern what Article 31(3)(c) VCLT means, it 
should be clearer what it cannot imply. As a rule of interpretation, it should entail a 
norm of conduct, without prescribing a particular outcome beforehand. As such, it 
cannot lead to the modification of the object and purpose of the treaty under 
                                                                   
106 Prud’homme, supra note 13, at 391 (see from 386). 
107 J. d’Aspremont, ‘Articulating International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: 
Conciliatory Interpretation under the Guise of Conflict of Norms-Resolution’, in M. Fitzmaurice and P. 
Merkouris (eds), The Interpretation and Application of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 1, at 27-28.  
108 P. Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law’ 1 Yale Human Rights 
and Development Law Journal (1998) 85, at 103. 
109  EC and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS316/AB/R, 18 May 2011, para. 846. 
110 See respectively G. Marceau, ‘WTO Settlement and Human Rights’ 13 EJIL (2002) 753, at 781; and 
B. McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law or “Systemic Integration” of Treaty Regimes’ 42 
Journal of World Trade (2008) 589, at 612. 
111 See, generally, D. French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’ 
55 ICLQ (2006) 281. 
112 ‘De l’Interprétation des Traités’, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (Session de Grenade, 
1956), at 330-332 and 337-338; and debate at the ILC, 765th sess., (A/CN.4/SR.765). 
113 See proposal by H. Waldock (Rapp.) and comments within the ILC, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in (1964) 
YBILC Vol. I, at 309-312. 
114 For details, see P. Merkouris, ‘Debating the Ouroboros of International Law: The Drafting History 
of Article 31(3)(c)’ 9 International Community Law Review (2007) 1. 
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interpretation, reading into it additional or different obligations to the ones stipulated, 
deferring their content and effect to those of the ‘relevant rules’ in the background.115 
That would amount to a wholesale incorporation of extraneous norms, replacing the 
substance of the treaty, in contravention of the good faith principle underpinning 
Article 31 VCLT as a whole.116 
 So, while it may be a sound starting point to consider that the parties to a 
treaty intended it ‘to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not in 
violation of it’,117 inferring thereby a positive intention to harmonise meanings and 
scopes with those of pre-existing norms, in the absence of tangible indications to that 
effect, goes too far.118 Such an approach would give more weight to pre-existing 
norms than to the current treaty, undermining the pacta sunt servanda rule and 
arbitrarily fixing meanings and stifling the very purpose of law-making by 
conventional agreement, beyond the requirements of jus cogens, third-party 
entitlements, and general principles of law.119 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT should indeed be taken as a rule of interpretation, 
rather than as a source of applicable law.120 When consistent interpretation is no 
longer a technique – a means to an end – but becomes an end in itself, it crosses the 
line between method and substance. Seeking systemic coherence may drive 
interpretation, but it cannot be its final goal. The normative ideal may translate into a 
procedural guideline to avoid conflict and enhance consistency within international 
law, but there is no obligation to achieve substantive unity as a result.121 There is no 
inter-regime meta-objective of normative assimilation. The opposite, brought to its 
logical extreme, may mean that the aim pursued by a given norm can only be realised 
to the extent it does not cause fragmentation of pre-existing standards. 
The system, however, is wide enough to accommodate a diversity of values,122 
which may or may not be reconciled through good faith interpretation. The risk of 
fragmentation should not be overrated.123 Discussion on this issue has been dominated 
by anxieties yet unverified.124 The mere fact of characterising the widening and 
deepening of international law as ‘fragmentation’ carries a load of negative 
connotations implying a false dichotomy – the binomial: harmony is good, divergence 
is bad. But divergence (or diversity) does not per se amount to conflict. Diversity 
rather responds to a need for nuance and sophistication, for particular solutions 
tailored to the specificities of different problems, drawing on different axiologies.  
                                                                   
115 A. Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ 14 EJIL (2003) 529, at 537. 
116 M. Virally, ‘Good Faith in Public International Law’ 77 American Journal of International Law 
(AJIL) (1983) 130. 
117  Right of Passage, at 142. 
118 Cf. Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran [1987-II] 15 Iran-USCTR 189, para. 112. 
119 Cf. McLachlan, supra note 8, at 311. 
120 For a similar approach regarding Art. 21(3) ICC Statute, see R. Young, ‘Internationally Recognized 
Human Rights Before the International Criminal Court’ 60 ICLQ (2011) 189. 
121 In this line, see A. Clapham, ‘Concluding Remarks: Three Tribes Engage on the Future of 
International Criminal Law’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) 689. 
122 M. Craven, ‘Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law’ 14 Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law (2003) 3. 
123 G. Hafner (Rapp.), The Risk ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, UNGAOR 55th 
Sess., Suppl. 10 (A/55/10), Annex 321. For a more balanced account, see B. Simma, ‘Fragmentation in 
a Positive Light’ 31 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (1999) 845. 
124 M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law?  Postmodern Anxieties’ 15 
LJIL (2002) 553; A.-C. Martineau, ‘The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International 
Law’ 22 LJIL (2009) 1. 
 14 
Coming back to IHL/IHRL/IRL, although there may be instances of 
irreducible conflict, in most cases the three regimes will be applicable in tandem, if 
not cumulatively as discussed below. Still, in the event of concurrent application, 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT does not resolve the issue of which of them should be elevated 
as main reference point. Article 31(3)(c) VCLT enters the scene once that decision 
has already been taken. It governs the relationship of one particular treaty with its 
external normative environment, linking it to the wider system of international law. 
But it does not regulate cross-regime relations as such. How the decision on the 
reference framework should be made is what the next section explores. 
 
5. Reconfiguring Regime Relations from a Holistic Perspective 
 
5.1 Concurrent Application: Cumulative Approach  
 
If IHL, IHRL, and IRL are to preserve their specific ethos, unity shall not be reduced 
to uniformity.125 Pulkowski draws a distinction between ‘logical’ and ‘axiological’ 
coherence particularly relevant in this regard.126 While the former postulates the 
avoidance of ‘conflicts’ in the strict sense, the latter goes into substantive 
considerations, requiring also the prevention of ‘divergences’ – as if meta-values 
overarching international law were arranged in a specific order. If one accepts that the 
content of such super-axiology is malleable and recognise the law-making capacity of 
states as sovereigns, then one should equally admit the introduction of new values 
into the system via customary or conventional rule. Even recognising in the protection 
of human rights ‘the ultimate purpose of all law’,127 that alone may not translate into 
automatic priority vis-à-vis competing values. And even if it could, residual 
uncertainties would remain if all human rights ideals were rendered absolute and 
placed at the same level, begging for further hierarchisation among them.128 
 To accommodate diversity, it is more appropriate to adopt a narrow 
conception of conflict. A wide notion thereof risks curtailing the development of the 
very system it is intended to preserve – if originality or specialism is characterised as 
divergence, and divergence as conflict, and conflict, in turn, solved by reference to 
pre-existing law, there is very little space for new teloi to emerge. On the contrary, 
when conflict is understood as the impossibility of simultaneous fulfilment of two 
concurrent obligations, a wider scope for tailored responses remains available. 
On this basis, differences between IHL, IHRL, and IRL should not be 
automatically characterised as a ‘conflict’ to resolve or a ‘divergence’ to avoid. As 
long as one regime does not command what the other forbids, diversity should be 
tolerated. Thus in armed conflict situations there is no need to choose a particular 
reference framework. Instead, all three regimes should be considered to apply 
cumulatively. The essential point is to identify the range of state obligations 
applicable in the particular context. Cases of real conflict will be rare. And in the 
                                                                   
125 On different notions of ‘unity’, as structural necessity, substantive requirement, or epistemological 
postulate of international law, see D. Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict 
(OUP, 2014), at 204 ff. 
126 Ibid., at 214-215. 
127 H. Lauterpacht, International Law: Collected Papers, Vol. 2 (CUP, 1975), at 47. 
128 See, generally, S. Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights’ 19 EJIL (2008) 
749; I.D. Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law: The Human Rights Dimension (Intersentia, 
2001); and M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General 
International Law (OUP, 2009). 
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event of diverging commands, the state concerned will have to comply with the most 
stringent standard.129 
 When IHL permits what IHRL or IRL proscribe, there is no actual conflict. 
Parties to IHRL or IRL instruments subscribe to individual rights obligations of their 
own free will, thereby limiting the amount of discretion allowed to them under IHL – 
the same occurs in the reverse, where IHL offers higher protection. Sovereign powers 
must be exercised within the parameters of contracted commitments.130 Following the 
pacta sunt servanda principle, ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith’.131 States cannot select or unilaterally 
modify their obligations without incurring international responsibility.132 Once a State 
concludes a treaty it undertakes to exercise its prerogatives in conformity with it.133 
International obligations are cumulative and states must comply with all of them at all 
times they are applicable.134 
This is the path followed in practice by the ICJ in both the Wall Opinion and 
DRC v. Uganda, despite the rhetoric of lex specialis and systemic integration 
employed in each case. Materially, the Court cumulated IHL and IHRL obligations, 
without displacing or altering the substance of any of the applicable norms. This is 
also the approach adopted by the Strasbourg Court in Al-Jedda. Adjudicating on 
detention, it established that IHL contained a power to resort to indefinite internment 
without trial in particular circumstances, rather than an obligation to do so. Therefore, 
compliance with ECHR standards was not compromised. It could be secured simply 
by not interning the applicant in contravention of Article 5 ECHR.135 
The case for accumulation is supported by saving clauses in IHRL/IRL 
instruments and by the Martens clause in IHL, promoting a ‘higher standards’ 
approach. Also the reference in Additional Protocol I to ‘other applicable rules of 
international law relating to the protection of fundamental rights during international 
armed conflict’ goes in this direction,136 with the acknowledgment, in Additional 
Protocol II, ‘that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic 
protection to the human person’ reinforcing this conclusion.137 
In the relation between IHRL and IRL, human rights bodies as well as 
UNHCR have long accepted the cumulative application of non-refoulement 
guarantees. The end result is the ‘absolutisation’ of Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention. Indeed, while the exception contained in Article 33(2) contemplates 
instances in which refugees who pose a threat to the security of the asylum country 
may be returned to persecution, that possibility has been neutralised by the IHRL 
prohibition of torture, allowing for no restrictions.138 Following this understanding, 
                                                                   
129 The argument has been developed elsewhere. See V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Seeking Asylum in the 
Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea’ 
23 International Journal of Refugee Law (2011) 174. 
130 For an example of discretionary power allowed by an EU asylum instrument, but still limited and 
structured by it, see Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS & ME, 21 December 2011, para. 66.  
131 Art. 26 VCLT (emphasis added).  
132 See, for instance, Art. 30(5) VCLT.  
133 Wimbledon, at 25.  
134 Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, 21 February 1997, at 12-13, 
speaking of WTO treaties ‘as a single undertaking’. 
135 Al-Jedda v. UK [2011] 53 EHRR 23, para. 107 ff. 
136 Arts 51(1), 72, and 75(8) AP I. 
137 Preambular para. 3 AP II, 1125 UNTS 609. 
138 See e.g. E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Opinion’, in E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in 
International Law (CUP, 2003) 87. 
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refugees in war should benefit not only from IHL protections against forcible transfer 
or deportation, to the extent they qualify as ‘protected persons’,139 but cumulatively 
also from refoulement prohibitions in IHRL and IRL. 
 
5.2 Non-concurrent Application: Return to Article 31 VCLT  
 
Accumulation articulates the interplay between IHL, IHRL and IRL when they apply 
concurrently, according to their specific thresholds. For IHL to enter the scene, this 
means there has to be an armed conflict in IHL terms.140 Outside wartime or 
occupation, and beyond the very parties to the conflict, IHL has no direct role to play. 
When dealing with the aftermath of hostilities, for third countries unrelated to the 
confrontation, IHL does not constitute an immediate source of applicable law.141 
Therefore, the examination of asylum claims by refugees from war shall not be 
carried out against IHL as reference framework. In such situations, IRL and IHRL 
become (cumulatively) the leading standards, 142 with IHL possibly influencing their 
interpretation, pursuant to Article 31 VCLT.  
Different regions have adopted different solutions to cater for this category of 
persons. In Africa and Latin America, states have adopted a broad refugee definition 
as well as a broad understanding of armed conflict, covering all those who owing to 
‘generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of 
human rights’ or ‘events seriously disrupting public order’ have had to flee.143  
Europe, in contrast, has opted to complement the 1951 Convention, drawing 
on ‘international obligations under human rights instruments’ and the principle of 
non-refoulement.144 Consequently, foreigners who do not strictly qualify as refugees, 
‘but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that … if 
returned … would face a real risk of suffering serious harm’ must be granted 
subsidiary protection.145  
What constitutes ‘serious harm’ is defined in the Qualification Directive. 
There are three options: death penalty or execution; torture or equivalent treatment; or 
‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.146 The intricacy of 
this formulation has given rise to intense debate, particularly concerning the weight to 
be accorded to armed conflict as a cause of flight and whether IHL notions may be 
imported into the definition.147 
The ECJ, following Strasbourg’s lead,148 concluded in Diakité that the ‘usual 
meaning in everyday language of “internal armed conflict”’ shall be preferred, 
                                                                   
139 Arts 45(4) and 49(1) GC IV, in IACs; Art. 17 AP II, in NIACs.  
140 Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 67. 
141 Cf. Ziegler, supra note 90. 
142 Exemplifying this approach, see Joined Cases C-175/08 Abdulla [2010] ECR I-1493, paras 51-54. 
143 See respectively Art. 3, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted at ‘Coloquio sobre la 
Protección Internacional de los Refugiados de América Central, México y Panamá’, 19-22 November 
1984; Art. 1(2), OAU Refugee Convention, 1001 UNTS 45. 
144 Recital 34 QD. See also Case C-604/12 HN, 8 May 2014, paras 31-33. 
145 Arts 2(f) and 18 QD. 
146 Art. 15(c) QD. 
147 For elaboration and further references, see V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Of Autonomy, Autarky, Purposiveness 
and Fragmentation: The Relationship between EU Asylum Law and International Humanitarian Law’, 
in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 295. 
148 Sufi & Elmi v. UK [2012] 54 EHRR 9. See also L. Tsourdi, ‘What Protection for Persons Fleeing 
Indiscriminate Violence? The Impact of the European Courts on the EU Subsidiary Protection 
Regime’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds), supra note 2, 270. 
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describing simply ‘a situation in which a State’s armed forces confront one or more 
armed groups or in which two or more armed groups confront each other’. Neither the 
‘assessment of the intensity of such confrontations’ nor the ‘level of organisation’ of 
the parties involved were considered decisive.149 
Although the Court did not mention Article 31(3)(c) VCLT explicitly, it 
reached its conclusion after having considered the possible impact of IHL norms as 
presumptive ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties’. The Court, first, noted the terminological distinctions patent on simple 
reading of IHL texts. ‘International armed conflict’ and ‘armed conflict not of an 
international character’, which are the terms employed in Common Article 3 and 
Article 1(1) AP II, are not identical to the phrase ‘international or internal armed 
conflict’ used in EU law. Applicability thresholds were also taken into account. The 
Court observed that IHL requires ‘the existence of either type of conflict … as a 
trigger for [application]’. This, in the Court’s eyes, stemmed from the very object of 
IHL, which is to ‘govern the conduct both of [IACs] and of [NIACs]’. In that context, 
IHL is designed to ‘provide protection for civilian populations in a conflict zone by 
restricting the effects of war’, but, unlike EU law, ‘it does not … provide for 
international protection to be granted to certain civilians who are outside both the 
conflict zone and the territory of the conflicting parties’.150  
Consideration of these factors pushed the Court to conclude to the irrelevance 
of IHL as interpretative aid in the sense of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT. It underlined 
precisely that because IHL definitions ‘are not designed to identify situations in which 
… international protection would be necessary’, it was not required for a conflict to 
be categorised as IAC/NIAC to qualify as such under the Directive.151 
Having discarded IHL’s input, what the Court did instead – again without 
express mention – was to rely on a reading of Article 15(c) from the perspective of 
Article 31 VCLT taken as a whole. It decided that ‘since [the Qualification] Directive 
… does not define “internal armed conflict”, the meaning and scope of that phrase 
must … be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while 
also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of 
which it is part’.152 Both textual and teleological considerations played a significant 
part in the Court’s reasoning. Beside having regard to ‘[t]he usual meaning’ of armed 
conflict, it also looked at the specific purpose of subsidiary protection as a mechanism 
to ‘complement and add to the protection’ of the 1951 Convention.153 
The rest of the decision links the Court’s conclusion to the other components 
of Article 15(c) and its previous case law on the level and intensity of violence. 
Therefore, the main point of Diakité, for our purposes, is the interpretative strategy 
employed, arriving at an autonomous construction of ‘armed conflict’, based on 
Article 31(1) VCLT. 
The method is similar to that adopted in other authorities. Sufi & Elmi used 
‘armed conflict’ also in its plain meaning, to adjudicate the case of two applicants 
risking ill-treatment if removed to Somalia, without importing the IHL qualifications. 
The opposite could have pre-empted the application of the ECHR. It would have 
modified the threshold criterion in Article 1, pursuant to which ECHR rights must be 
secured by Contracting Parties ‘to everyone within their jurisdiction’, regardless of 
                                                                   
149 Diakité, paras 28, 32 and 34. 
150 Ibid., paras 20, 22 and 23 (emphasis added). 
151 Ibid., paras 23 and 35. 
152 Ibid., para. 27 (emphasis added). 
153 Ibid., para. 33. 
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whether there is a conflict – let alone, one meeting IHL criteria – in the country to 
which the person is envisaged to return. Armed conflict, in a non-refoulement 
evaluation, pertains to the factual background to assess to establish whether removal 
conforms to Convention standards. But it does not possess the special legal meaning 
ascribed to the term under IHL. Following Article 31(4) VCLT, the party invoking an 
IHL reading of ECHR standards must provide proof to that effect.154 
This does not mean IHL plays no role in these situations. As part of the factual 
analysis to determine whether the level of violence in Mogadishu was of such 
intensity as to pose per se ‘a real risk to the life or person of any civilian in the 
capital’, the Court recognised a possible function for IHL. Factors such as the 
‘methods and tactics’ employed, whether these ‘increased the risk of civilian 
casualties’ or were ‘directly targeting civilians’, etc were indicative of the kind of 
violence and the risks run in the event of expulsion. Yet, as mere indicators, the Court 
alerted they were not ‘an exhaustive list to be applied in all cases’.155  There may, 
indeed, be situations of general risk of ill-treatment where armed conflict is not a 
factor but non-refoulment protection is nonetheless activated.156 
The same terms may have different meanings, depending on the context and 
the object and purpose of the treaty where they are found.157 The fact that other 
branches of international law employ IHL-like vocabulary does not translate into its 
legal technical meaning being imported. As noted by the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, ‘the application of international rules on interpretation … to identical 
or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results’.158 The 
temptation to transplant legal notions from one regime to another mechanically should 
be resisted. The emergence of ‘autonomous’ concepts is not always synonymous with 
isolationist accounts of international law, but a consequence of diversity and 
specialisation, taking the object and purpose of a treaty as well as the obligations it 
creates seriously and in good faith.159 Ultimately, what is advocated here is a re-
conceptualisation of regime relations along the lines of the pacta sunt servanda rule 
and Article 31 VCLT taken as a whole – putting Article 31(3)(c) VCLT against the 
entire ‘general rule of interpretation’. 
 
6. Conclusion: Rationalising Systemic Coherence  
 
In some instances, ‘coherence has to be sacrificed for some other good’.160 As the 
previous sections have attempted to elucidate, there is no need for the search of 
axiological uniformity to systematise regime relations. The principle of good faith and 
the general rule of interpretation enshrined in the VCLT provide appropriate tools to 
articulate them in a rational way. 
 The unity of international law is flexible enough to accommodate diversity – 
the entire system is in fact predicated on the existence of law-making powers of states 
                                                                   
154 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), ICJ 
Reports (1948) 57, at 63; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports (1975) 12, para. 116. 
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pursuing a variety of objectives following the evolution of time and the emergence of 
new needs and societal preoccupations. In the absence of an overarching mechanism 
establishing value priorities across branches of the system, value-related judgments to 
allocate pre-eminence ex post do not seem justified. Therefore, employing intra-
regime devices such as the lex specialis maxim to regulate cross-regime relations is 
inappropriate. As the ‘displacement model’ in Section 2 has demonstrated, it does not 
solve the problem – it rather displaces it to a different plane. Similarly, the 
‘complementarity model’ so long as it remains based on axiological assumptions of 
value convergence and adaptation is unfitting, as Section 3 has shown. 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, if understood as a procedural rule of conduct, offers a 
better perspective. However, as the analysis of the ‘harmonisation model’ has 
disclosed in Section 4, the provision is incapable of determining on its own the 
reference regime among parallel standards. Where harmonious integration reaches its 
limits, the cumulative application paradigm, proposed in Section 5, offers a principled 
response, revealing that there is no real choice to be made in cases of concurrent 
application. Good faith requires the simultaneous observance by states of all their 
international obligations applicable in a particular situation. The way of 
accommodating divergence is through compliance with the various relevant 
standards, stemming from the different regimes, at the same time.  
IHL, IHRL and IRL should hence be capable of deploying their intended 
effects, in accordance with their respective object and purpose and ‘other applicable 
rules of international law’ possibly ‘granting greater protection’ to the individuals 
involved.161 In most instances, the three regimes will adjust constructively to one 
another, without the interpreter having to engage in exercises of uncritical 
assimilation or arbitrary selectivity of the relevant norms.  
Cases of real conflict in the form of truly opposing obligations will be 
extremely rare. At that point, perhaps, some may have evolved into jus cogens, while 
others become obsolete, rendering the conflict solvable in this way. Genuinely 
irreducible conflicts will have no immediate solution through interpretation. Those 
occasions, however, should not be demonised as causes of fragmentation, but rather 
seized as opportunities to re-open debates on value choices to be revisited.  
                                                                   
161 Arts 72 and 75(8) AP I. See also preambular para. 3 AP II; Art. 53 ECHR; Art. 5(2) ICCPR; and 
Art. 5 Refugee Convention. 
